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 “Forget about fingerprints or iris recognition; the way you walk or move your hands, even 
your pulse, can be analysed for unique characteristics. EU-funded researchers are looking at 
ways this new technology could protect your security and make identity checking less 
obtrusive and more accurate” 1. 
 
Western societies face two paradoxical anxieties regarding political and social regulation: 
security and privacy. One of the political choices of the European Union trying to solve this 
double bind resides in the promotion of technological solutions, such as ‘soft biometrics’. 
Funding instruments such as 6th and 7th Framework Programmes promoted research in soft 
biometrics, following the objectives of robust identification while respecting privacy and 
bodily integrity. This new kind of biometrics shows great promise. As Dr Tzovaras says of 
the results of the ACTIBIO2 project:  
 
(…) this is a revolutionary improvement for dynamic recognition. And when we 
combine dynamic and static biometric systems, the equal error rate drops to zero; 
identification is correct every time. We can see many excellent applications for 
authenticating individuals and monitoring their behaviours without having to intrude 
into or interrupt what they are doing”3. 
 
This non-intrusiveness is promoted as a technical quality which could render biometrical 
technologies harmless - indeed in some cases democratic - and therefore that could solve the 
famous "trade-off between security and privacy." Non-intrusive technologies are not only 
dedicated to biometric uses, but to any monitoring devices incorporating this quality of non-
intrusiveness into their technological nature, for example when securing delimited critical 
infrastructures (CI), which is the objective of the P54 and IPATCH5. A new form of 
                                                
1 http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/88445_en.html  
2 http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/85410_en.html  
3 http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/88445_en.html  
4“ “P5 project is the acronym of“ “Privacy Preserving Perimeter Protection Project”“ and is a 
European and FP7 funded project for the protection of critical infrastructures to benefit the 
sustainability of society and future well-being of European Citizens. Our vision is an intelligent 
perimeter proactive surveillance system that works robustly under a wide range of weather and 
lighting conditions. The system will monitor the region outside the security area of critical buildings 
and infrastructures, and give an early warning if terrestrial or airborne threats are approaching. The 
envisioned system will support, rather than replace, a human operator. A low false alarm rate from 
animals or other innocuous events, combined with high threat detection sensitivity and privacy 
standards, are central ambitions of the project.”“ http://www.foi.se/en/Customer--
Partners/Projects/P5/P51/  
5 IPATCH (Intelligent Piracy Avoidance using Threat detection and Countermeasure Heuristics) is 
also a European and FP7 funded project, whose objectives are the detection of piracy threats in good 
time in high-risk areas. “IPATCH will provide technology to protect ships and their crews from the 
modern-day scourge of piracy that is proliferating throughout the world, bringing severe human, 
financial and political costs, as well as affecting international seaborne trade. The IPATCH system 
will use advanced sensors and data fusion to provide the Master of the ship with the information 
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surveillance could emerge, lighter and less agressive. The walls become invisible. As 
underlined by Frank Neisse and Alexandra Novosseloff:  
 
“(…) first made of continuous obstacles of concrete or steel at regular intervals, of 
observation towers, walls progressively incorporate multiple electronic detection 
equipment. In the United States, drones equipped with infrared cameras now fly 
regularly along parts of the border. 30-meter-high observation towers have been 
installed in desert areas: there are soaring metal pylons on which are fixed cameras 
and radars able of covering 45 kilometers of border. This electronic ensemble 
constitutes thus a kind of "invisible wall" which will detect nearly 95% of migrants, 
according to the Border Patrol. This virtual wall, costing an exorbitant amount, has the 
great advantage of being more "acceptable" in the eyes of the people concerned, 
because it is less visible and, apparently, less violent.” (Neisse & Novosseloff, 
2010 :736) 
 
The wish of the EU, through the funding of such research, resides in the idea that some 
political and social issues will be resolved through the possibility of creating virtuous 
technologies, both respectful of fundamental rights and privacy and yet effective for their 
monitoring objectives. Thus, the search produced PET (Privacy Enhancing Technologies) and 
the concept of 'Privacy by Design6,' inaugurated by Ann Cavoukian, has emerged in the 
research and development sector. By integrating constraints of privacy at the heart of the 
construction of technological artefacts, one entrusts to technologies the power to solve the 
social, political and legal issues caused previously by the uses of surveillance. 
One of the recogniseable attributes of all these surveillance technologies7 is their non-
intrusiveness, which we prefer to designate as virtuality. They are promoted as less invasive 
to the extent that their control is not "material", that is to say that surveillance is not always 
palpable in material terms, nor physically felt. Surveillance, in this process of 
‘invisibilisation’, should alleviate the unpleasant weight of social control, while being 
extremely effective. Virtuality could then be seen as a softening of control: a kind of 
nonviolent surveillance, but efficient and certain. However, this is not the case. Indeed, this 
phenomenon of the "virtualization" of surveillance is more an extension and intensification of 
surveillance power. More materiality must be considered for this virtualization, since it is 
intended to serve as a form of political management of specific spaces (such as borders or 
urban areas) and human bodies (which we may designate with the foucaldian term of 
‘biopolitics’).	
                                                                                                                                                   
needed to decide how best to mitigate the threat, be that calling for assistance or bringing the crew into 
the secure citadel.” http://www.ipatchproject.eu/  
6 “In the early 1990s, the concept of Privacy by Design (PbD) was developed to address the systemic 
effects of ICT and networked data systems. The central thesis of PbD is that privacy cannot be 
protected solely through compliance with regulatory instruments; rather, technologies should be 
designed with privacy in mind from the outset. Instead of bolting on privacy enhancing features, 
privacy enhancing tools e.g. minimisation of unnecessary data collection, should be integrated into 
systems design” (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, Jim Dratwa (ed.) ,“ 
“Ethics of Security and Surveillance Technologies”, Opinion n° 28, (2014): 32. For a presentation of 
the 7 Fundamental Principles of the privacy by design approach; Cavoukian, Ann, Privacy by design, 
The 7 Foundational Principles, https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf 
7 David Lyon defines surveillance as “any collection and processing of personal data, whether 
identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” 
David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Oxford: Open, 2001), 2. 
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Meanings of virtualisation in monitored spaces 
 
In his book on the political history of barbed wire, Olivier Razac (2009) emphasizes five basic 
features of virtualisation of spatial boundaries. Although his analysis applies mainly to barbed 
wire (which represents a milestone in this history of virtualisation), it suggests that 
virtualization of technologies is as much in evidence in their use of lightweight material as in 
their frightening effectiveness. Between the old barbed wire and virtual walls made of new 
surveillance technologies, only the material has changed. 	
What exactly are the meanings of virtualisation, according to Razac? 
 
• Virtualization means first material erasure. We could hit a brick wall, a virtual wall is 
intangible. 
• In addition, relief from material allows a gain in mobility. While a fortress wall is 
difficult to build, barbed wire walls are installed with great ease and without 
significant costs. 
• Such a mobility allows high flexibility. Rather than a delimitation of fixed and 
definitive spaces, a virtual wall can follow movements and flows. Unlike the stone, 
"the metal wire is a tensile material that bends under the action of an external force. 
This deformation action has the effect of absorbing the energy impact and increasing 
the resistance of the wire. (...) Flexibility and mobility combine in order to allow the 
absorption of aggression, the agressor is entrapped and gradually weakened.”(Razac 
2009: 150). 
• Razac also highlights the discretion that a virtual boundary enables. Far from being a 
sign of weakness, the power of this type of delimitation lies in its discretion. It avoids 
frontal resistance and opposition. 
• Finally, virtual boundaries are characterized by their reactivity. Barbed wire walls can 
slow down an attack and gain time to react. In addition, because any space in front of 
the wire can be monitored, a panoptic effect reinforces the feeling of being monitored 
and potentially deters crossing the virtual wall. 
 
Olivier Razac defines the concept of virtualisation of spatial boundaries from the study of a 
relatively low-tech device: barbed wire. It is therefore not necessary to mobilize digitised 
surveillance technologies as determining causes to understand this phenomenon of 
"virtualisation". On the contrary, the sense of the role of these technologies should rather be 
interpreted with reference to this virtualisation process. 
 
 
Virtuality as political management of space 
 
How to understand what is crucially at stake in this phenomenon of virtualisation? One must 
first avoid assimilating virtual to "less real." As Razac points out, "virtualisation does not 
mean less control of space, on the contrary, a relief from physical presence is made in an act 
of separation for the direct benefit of the authority’s capacity to act " (Razac 2009: 159). One 
should understand virtualisation as a new form of "political management of space", rather 
than a de-politicisation of space. It is less control than opening and closing spaces in order to 
manage the flow of open spaces, "managing permeability." "Controlling population without 
curbing it", because the goal is not to "block, but to let circulate "(Razac 2009: 125). The 
main issue is to manage what Michel Lussault call "trans-spatiality" that is to say "the specific 
action of passing" (Lussault 2012: 71). This management of crossing and access is based on 
different protocols. Michel Lussault especially evokes the act of spinning or queuing, namely 
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an analysis of the optimization of the queuing process. He also mentions filtering, which 
“grants access for the purposes of verification - usually the right to penetrate the space and/or 
content of what an individual or a container carries” (Lussault 2012: 71). Finally, the tracing 
process consists in "following an item entered into a spatial organization and at least identify 
its exit, better, its steps and its exit, better yet, all its movements and positions in a real-time 
process” (Lussault 2012: 72). 
Even more than the passing or the crossing, the movement itself becomes the object of control 
and surveillance. So-called "smart" technologies can automatically detect behaviour 
considered as abnormal (or potentially abnormal): “it is possible to analyse behaviour 
considered as suspicious in open or public places: frequent stops, counterflow traffic, 
excessive or insufficient speed, group size, abandoned object, etc. with all the possible crosses 
between different chosen criteria” (Razac 2009: 220). 
John Amos Lecat-Deschamps also considers videosurveillance as virtual walls (Lecat-
Deschamps 2012: 124-9). The cameras are indeed sparsely visible in public space. On the 
opposite of the physical wall, CCTV do not try to "block", they "do not create any immediate 
physical consequence". They track and analyze flow. Similarly, they have a panoptical 
deterrent effect. Individuals know they are seen, interiorizing somehow expected norms of 
behaviour in specific spaces. 
 
 
Virtuality as virtue 
 
Let’s go further in exploring this virtuality. In the paper “Border work: surveillant 
assemblages, virtual fences, and tactical countermedia”, Tamar Vukov and Mimi Sheller point 
out the proximity between the words “virtuality” and “virtue”: “Virtuality also carries 
connotations of “virtue” - the virtue of borders, the virtuous traveler, the good passenger 
versus the unvirtuous, the cheater, the stowaway and the smuggler” (Vukov & Sheller 2013: 
225-241). This proximity raises different questions: is it possible to propound a fixed, neutral 
and objective definition of a normal behaviour? Or is it possible to consider “normality” as a 
temporal and socially-embedded phenomenon? By classifying the behaviour of moving object 
as innocuous or as potential threats, virtual fences could define certain kinds of behaviour as 
virtuous.  
For Ajana, “Governments and companies often promote the illusion that algorithmic 
processes and data-driven systems are purged from human bias and interference leading to 
more neutral, objective and automated decisions that are devoid of discrimination on the basis 
of race, ethnicity etc.”. However, according to Ajana, such a belief needs to be interrogated. 
She quotes Dwork and Mulligan: “Both the datasets and the algorithms reflect choices, among 
others, about data, connections, inferences, interpretation, and thresholds for inclusion that 
advance a specific purpose [...] classification systems are neither neutral nor objective, but are 
biased toward their purposes. They reflect the explicit and implicit values of their designers” 
(Dwork & Mulligan 2013). 
The virtue of technologies pretends to stay in a so-called neutrality of values, because of the 
objectivity of the technological devices. But no technology has never been neutral or deprived 
of values. In reality, biometrical technologies valorize some norms and behaviours by 
accepting them or by refusing others, such as smart CCTV programmed to detect abnormal 
behaviours. This process of sorting contributes to normalized norms and behaviours and to the 
perception of acceptable body types, movements and behaviours. 
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Virtuality as virtuosity 
 
Tamar Vukov and Mimi Sheller also point out the semantic proximity between “virtuality” 
and “virtuosity”: “So on entering the virtual border space of the airport one becomes not only 
a virtual passenger (shadowed by the ‘‘data double’’, a kind of informational penumbra), but 
also a virtuous passenger (performing virtue and virtuosity)” (Vukov & Sheller 2013: 225-
241). 
This second proximity raises a second issue. “Virtual fences” not only monitor a perimeter, 
they can also “perform” it. Virtual fences do not only detect moving objects, they could also 
affect these objects. People walking around a monitored perimeter could adjust, with 
virtuosity, their behaviour to the mechanism of surveillance. Human beings are very specific 
“moving objects”. They are “reflexive moving objects”. Virtuosity becomes a necessary 
quality in order to pass borders and cross areas. Surveillance technologies contribute to the 
social sorting process, when distinguishing individuals according to their virtuosity to pass 
borders and to move through spaces. They reactivate domination criteria such as class, race 
and gender. Virtuosity is the ability to transcend or even to cheat with those criteria. 
Etienne Balibar points out the "multiple meanings" of borders. Meanings of borders change 
according to the direction of crossing or according to who crosses, whether a businessman or 
an unemployed male youth of immigrant origin. “In this latter case, a border becomes almost 
two distinct entities, which have nothing in common but a name. Today's borders (though in 
reality this has long been the case) are, to some extent, designed to perform precisely this 
task: not merely to give individuals from different social classes different experiences of the 
law, the civil administration, the police and elementary rights, such as the freedom of 
circulation and freedom of enterprise, but actively to differentiate between individuals in 
terms of social class” (Balibar 2002 : 81-82). 
 
 
Virtuality as potentiality 
 
Virtual fences do not only extend the object of surveillance from a spatial point of view, but 
also from a temporal point of view. The future is also monitored. Early warning system try to 
detected “potential” threatening behaviours. Monitoring the future raises both epistemological 
and ethical issues. In R&D projects, the future is envisaged from "projected scenarios" 
selected by the engineers. It is essential not to confuse these scenarios with reality itself. By 
definition, the future is not exhaustively foreseeable. We always select and prioritize 
potentiality, we choose some scenarios over others. Our relation to the future is framed by an 
“economy of attention” (Balibar 2002 : 81-82).  
For Didier Bigo, the risk today is that we deny this radical unpredictability of the future and 
pretend that we have the capacity “to read the future as if it were a “future perfect8”. As he 
says, “security technology professionals now want to reduce all these possible futures to just 
one; which is often the future of the worst case scenario. And it is this selected future that 
they read as a future perfect, as a future already fixed, a future they already know (…) [This] 
is the by-product of the existence of transnational guilds of professionals of (in)security who 
share the same view of the world to come” (Bigo & Delmas-Marty 2011).   
                                                
8 In french: “un futur antérieur”, that is to say, literally, a previous future. 
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Reading the future is not only a scientific and a technological task. It is also a political 
challenge. How to "democratize" this economy of attention? Should we organize a collective 
deliberation on the "projected scenarios" selected in technological projects?  
 
 
Virtuality and the political process of bordering 
 
A last question concerns the political process of bordering. Virtual fences could deeply 
modify the way we understand political borders. To the question “what is a border?” Etienne 
Balibar responds that it is not possible to give a simple answer: “Basically because we cannot 
attribute to the border an essence which would be valid in all places and at all times, for all 
physical scales and time periods, and which would be perceived in the same way in all 
individual and collective experience“(Balibar 2002 : 81-82). 
This theoretical complexity contrasts with the practical simplicity with which borders have 
been build. Balibar writes: “In other words, their practical definition requires a ‘reduction of 
complexity’, the application of a simplifying force”. Balibar adds: “the consequence has been 
that the borders within which the conditions for a relative democracy have in some cases been 
won, have themselves always been absolutely anti-democratic institutions, beyond the reach 
of any political purchase or practice”. That’s why it is important to be concerned with “what 
democratic control is exerted on the controllers of borders - that is to say, on states and supra-
national institutions themselves”. 
Therefore, virtualization of fences does not lead to a democratization of borders. On the 
contrary, we should admit the hypothesis that virtualization of surveillance implies a more 
difficult and complex democratisation of borders. One of the risks is that virtualization 
increases a high "social acceptability of borders", making them less visible and more discreet, 
without any democratic debate about their management. 
 
 
Extension and intensification of surveillance 
 
In conclusion, it seems essential to consider that virtualization does not mean a reduction of 
supervisory power, but is the exercise of a new materiality of this power, gaining a kind of 
extension. First, because its objective is not only to cross borders or boundaries, but also to 
move through space. Moreover, the extension of this power is not solely spatial, it is also 
temporal, because the purpose of these ‘smart’ devices is to detect illicit or abnormal 
behaviours - and even the supposed intention of repressible behaviour. As Btihaj Ajana 
writes, “the future, as such, is now gradually becoming a computing object made of 
speculative algorithmic probability” (Ajana 2015: 58-78). 
Secondly, virtualization processes do not mean a de-realisation of walls and borders. It would 
be a mistake to understand the “virtualization of border" as a phenomenon implying the 
disappearance of the border or the limit. Virtualization does not make a fence less real. By 
contrast, a characteristic of virtual fences is that “bordering” is not made only by means that 
are “actual”, that is to say, embedded in materiality, but also with “virtual means”, in the 
sense of “potential”. By “potential means” should not be understood less real. By “potential 
means”, we understand means which are “actualized” when necessary - an example is a patrol 
that only intervenes when electronic sensors trigger an alarm (Razac 2009). 
Moreover, virtual fences could be used in combination with a physical fence. Btihaj Ajana 
argues that virtual fences “augment the function and the intensity of borders“ (Ajana 2015: 
58-78). Virtual fences can also create a purely virtual limit where it would not have been 
possible to build a wall for economic, technical or political reasons. 
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Finally, surveillance is interiorised and intensified. With this new configuration of panoptic 
power, individuals, knowing they are seen, tend to act in order to comply with the expected 
normal behaviour. This results in "mental barriers" (Lecat-Deschamps 2012) or "interiorised 
limits" (Sabot 2012). Olivier Razac, referencing Michel Lussault on this phenomenon, writes: 
"the limits are often mental and immaterial, built into the spatial capital of each operator, and 
therefore their effects are powerful because they remain necessary even when no physical 
barriers are erected to organize spatiality" (Lussault 2007:198). 
 
 
Virtualisation facing biopolitics 
 
We showed that virtuality raises crucial ethical and political issues concerning the political 
management of space and temporality. What about individuals? How does this virtuality 
impact them? 
A strong hypothesis might assume that the pervasiveness of surveillance technologies puts us 
in a permanent biometric regime, due to the possibility of aggregate data being constantly 
connected to one or more individuals. Can we imagine the virtualization of technologies 
actually passing through bodies? Digital surveillance technologies, including biometric 
technologies, also have the effect of "virtual tagging". They place us in a full biometric 
regime, to the extent that the collected and aggregated data can be connected to one or more 
individuals. Our lives are continuously measured, compared, profiled and/or evaluated. 
This full biometric regime engenders biopolitics, in the sense that identifying, recognizing and 
monitoring the order of life itself (body or bodily parts) is biopolitical scheduling, much as 
public health policies target morbidity, birth or epidemics. This is about monitoring masses of 
bodies while being able to focus on a particular body, deviant, unwanted or dangerous, if the 
need arises. 
 
 
Biometrics as a new biopolitics 
 
Let us return to the foundations of biopolitics. In 1977, Michel Foucault defined biopower as 
a technique of power, acting through the matter of the body, "society's control over 
individuals is not only carried out through consciousness or ideology, but also through the 
body and with the body. The body is a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political 
strategy" (Foucault 2010 : 210). 
Foucault thinks this political investment of bodies occurs on a double level, firstly on the 
individual level of singular existence and, secondly, in terms of the population, through 
political economy and the governance of social behaviour. He distinguishes on the one hand 
anatomo-politics as the study of strategies and practices by which power models individuals, 
from school to factory; monitoring and straightening individuals’ bodies. Then, on the other, 
he distinguishes biopolitics as the political management of life, targeting not particular 
individuals, but entire populations; this involves managing health, hygiene, diet, sexuality and 
natality as political issues. In 1979, he wrote a summary of his lecture ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ 
and defined biopolitics as "the way we have tried, since the 18th century, to rationalize the 
problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena engendered through an ensemble of 
livings constituted as a population: health, hygiene, birth, life, race..." (Foucault 2010 : 818). 
Let us focus on the genealogy of biometrics. Giorgio Agamben provides an early intuition. He 
compares biometrical practices to the political paradigm of the concentration camp, because 
of the tagging of bodies as a means of identification: “Thus, by applying to the citizen, or 
rather the human being as such, the techniques and devices invented for the dangerous 
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classes, States - which should be in the heart of politics - have transformed the citizen into the 
‘usual suspect’, to the extent that humanity itself becomes a dangerous class. A few years ago, 
I wrote that the political paradigm of Western societies was not the City anymore, but the 
concentration camp, and that we had passed from Athens to Auschwitz. It was obviously a 
philosophical thesis, and not a historical narrative, because one should not confuse 
phenomena that should rather be distinguished. However, I would suggest that tattooing 
probably appeared in Auschwitz as the most natural and most economical way to manage the 
inscription and registration of the deported in concentration camps” (Agamben 2004). 
Biometrics reactivates the figure of the concentration camp by rigorously identifying the 
living body with a person's identity, and making a passport from a physical detail. At the 
same time, biometrics performs this reactivation with an entirely new spirit: by rendering 
neutral and objective this naturalization of personal identity, and by simply designating it as 
convenient, useful, efficient and fast, biometrics can delete any infamous intention or 
degrading tagging. What was an infamous marking becomes a discrete recognition mode, 
which is difficult to oppose with notions of consent or consciousness. All the strength of 
biometrics lies in this "discretion", this virtual marking, almost invisible, almost impermanent 
compared to the logic of concentration camps and tattoos. 
 
 
From Auschwitz to 9/11 
 
However, we remain within a time of great infamy. Since 9/11, images of borders, migrants 
and terrorists have replaced those of concentration camps and Jews. Biopolitical practice is 
still relevant, though far from attaining saturation, in the sense that it overflows across the 
landscape of the society of control. Boundaries are the territory of post-9/11 biometrics: 
physical boundaries (sea walls, deserts, etc.) or intangible boundaries ("critical infrastructure", 
transit zones in airports). 
Garapon and Foessel (2006) underlined that the generalization of biometrics finds its initial 
justification in the anonymity that characterises terrorist actions. It seems an appropriate and 
effective response to the fear of erasing traditionally accepted criteria for danger, such as 
nationality or religious affiliation. Biometrical parameters can identify any individual without 
knowing their national or community affiliation and according to criteria that owe nothing to 
his/her biography. And because of this kind of identification, biometrics allows the tracking 
of anything, such as monitoring the transport of goods on the principle of "traceability". The 
challenge is to identify individuals, to store their routes and to deduce a degree of danger from 
the nature of their observed movements.  
Garapon and Foessel (2006) believed that ethnic, religious or racial considerations disappear 
with biometrics. We do not share this opinion: firstly, biometrics is now able to trace and 
digitize these criteria, and secondly, biometrics uses these criteria by superimposing them. 
However, any biographical or narrative consideration of race is effectively excluded: it is seen 
as pollution and noise. 
As we have already mentioned, the symbol of the full biometric regime is the migrant. 
Migrants are exposed to the same biometrical biopolitics: bone tests, hairiness, teething tests, 
and genital tests are imposed in order to determine the real age of a person, declaring whether 
he/she is a minor. DNA tests are also conducted to establish the real kinship between two 
people seeking family reunification, and biometrical tests in order to verify the real identity of 
an individual... 
Biometrics is enrolled in a context where generalized surveillance becomes increasingly 
deterritorialized and intrusive, such as terrorism. Terrorism and biometric practices seem 
symetrical and become systemic. Terrorism, according to Garapon and Foessel, uses several 
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strategies: firstly, that of individual indiscrimination and of confusion between private and 
public. Privileged spaces for the terrorist attack are what Marc Augé (1992) calls "non-
places", places full of crowds but empty of subjects, such as airports, subways, train stations, 
shopping malls. Thus another terrorist strategy takes place: by targeting non-places, terrorism 
uses a "strategy of ubiquity": any place, provided it is full, is likely to become a battlefield. 
"Non-places" are uninhabited, they are crossed by crowd flows, which are essentially 
anonymous because not recognized as ‘subjects’ of those places. The figure of the terrorist is 
built symetrically into this constraint: he/she also wants to be anonymous, invisible - in full 
enjoyment of the presumption of innocence typical of Western democracies. Thus he/she 
meets the norm of verisimilitude, the apparent normal stream of everyday life, until the actual 
trigger point of the terrorist act. Based on this ordinary and quotidian nature, the horror and 
unpredictability of the act and therefore its effects are increased, occuring in the vast forum of 
scandalous publicity, relayed by social media and breaking news TV shows. Garapon and 
Foessel use the term "delayed visibility" to describe this strategy. It is to counteract this 
strategy that biometrical systems think, anticipate, predict and understand terrorist intentions. 
Biometrics is both a biopolitical practice and a set of techno-scientific products from research 
projects. The full biometric regime is a political choice, relying on the hope of a tipping point 
between the dissimulation and the visibility of a terrorist. This hope relies on identification 
criteria, stable because computerized, and encoded in a universal language, and permanent 
because registered in the permanence of the body. 
It is thus the very materiality of the body, taken in the specific readability of the code, that 
enables a guarantee of identities and intentions. The intention here is not, in the sense that 
‘Nature’ would comprehend them, a naturalization of the body, to assign and individuate. 
Indeed, bodies subjected to the full biometric regime are a construction, because they need to 
be read through a variety of biometric technologies. Nonetheless, a form of attachment to the 
'naturality' of the body is demonstrated by the primordial nature of the flesh, without being 
embedded in any process of individuation. Citizens or subjects are not necessary here - what 
counts is only the materiality of their bodies.  
 
 
(Human) bodies do not lie 
 
There is an assertion of technoscientific and political truth: the body does not lie, although 
technology may indeed sometimes misread or hear badly. Faced with a radical and permanent 
uncertainty, the only possible and visible landmark is the truth of the body. But the truth of 
the body is enunciated by a neutral and universal technoscience, completely unaware of its 
privileged and dominant position9. These modes of veridiction appear normal and natural. 
This a posteriori naturalization of the physical evidence of the body also plays a role in the 
attachment to the distinctly ‘biological’ body, and therefore to the denial and rejection of any 
narrative or biographical possibility. 
What is being played out, therefore, is a possible desubjection that occurs in the very design 
of biometrical artifacts. Facial Recognition of Emotions is a biometric technology capable of 
processing the expression of emotions in real-time. In this case, it is neither the emotions nor 
                                                
9 Similarly, american feminists denounced the "male gaze" as a dominant and privileged position. 
Donna Haraway, among others feminists, compares the male gaze with the status of science when 
described as neutral, objective or universal. A kind of predation is exerted by the scientist who 
observes and produces scientific facts from nature. 
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the feelings themselves that are identified, but only their expression, digitized by algorithms 
that are in turn derived from deterministic psychological models10. 
Another example are bodycams. These are small cameras attached to police uniforms, that 
police officers can snap on in the event of contentious situations. Here also, one can observe 
the conjunction of the body and the artifact producing a regime of truth. Neither the story of 
the marchers nor the story of the officer has value when compared to the "narrative" of video-
footage hooked to the body. 
Thus a strange regime of legitimacy is being established: the body is legitimate only if it is 
depoliticised with regard to the state. Deprived of subjectivity and read as code, dignity only 
exists insofar as the observed object agrees to be reduced to a ‘suffering body’ or a 
‘humanitarian body’. This body then acquires rights, like little Francesca11, in May 2015. The 
humanitarian body, starving in Africa, is granted the opportunity to obtain rights; but political 
or economic migrants arriving on Europe’s borders are being escorted back, because they are 
undesirable once they have left their ‘natural’ habitat, Africa. 
How to describe this bodily attachment embedded in the biometric system? It is biopolitical, 
inasmuch as it is a commitment to bodily materialities. However this body is dis-integrated, 
performing a non-integrity process, notably because of this attachment to bodily materialities 
through which biometric devices scan. The lived or experienced body is not convoked, 
because it is unable to provide a reliable basis for recognition, nor is the physical body, 
subject as it is to the vagaries of time and the possibility of concealment. Thus the biometric 
body is a paradox, insofar as it is both objectified (reduced to computer parameters) and 
natural (unalterable). 
Speaking of body attachment is also taking the expression literally: what is the body tied, 
bound, connected to? These bodies are integrally attached to biometrical technologies and 
shaped in a systemic process of individuation, or becoming12, through these technologies. 
Technologies shape bodies, despite us and with us; bodies and techonologies are engaged in a 
hermeneutical relationship that is yet to be written. This hybridity becomes primordial with 
regard to modes of existence of the body and challenges any ontological or naturalized 
primacy. No natural body pre-exists in a temporality that is thickened by digital 
intensification. The biometrical hybrid body is instantiated in a temporality that is understood 
as a ‘future perfect’ (cf. supra), with a non-narrative, because encoded, type of performativity.  
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that digital virtuality, described in terms of non-
intrusiveness or invisibility, cannot elude some very concrete material effects: there is an 
intensification and extension of the power of surveillance technologies, through the spatio-
temporal organization of both borders and urban areas, and through the bodies of individuals. 
Biopolitics, as described by Foucault, takes a new face and encompasses new challenges. 
Surveillance technologies have shown their ability to intensify the power of sovereignty and 
disciplinary techniques. This is especially what Deleuze sensed when writing the "Postscript 
                                                
10 Paul Ekman is an american professor of psychology. Computerized models for the facial recognition 
of emotions, based on Ekman’s work on the facial expression of emotions (with Friesen, Haggard and 
Isaacs), allow the improvement of surveillance technologies. See more about Paul Ekman; 
http://www.paulekman.com/paul-ekman/  
11 The Nigerian child, Francesca, was born May 4th, 2015, on a boat full of migrants. She touched Italy 
with her extraordinary birth by representing two biblical figures, Moses saved from the waters and 
Jesus, born in a stable, "poor among the poor." No doubt that she will receive Italian citizenship as a 
birth gift ... http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/04/rescued-mediterranean-migrant-gives-
birth-baby-girl-italian-navy-ship  
12 Becoming (devenir) is a concept coined by Deleuze and Guattari in “A Thousand Plateaus” (1980).  
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on the Societies of Control” in 1990, in which he described a world of surveillance and 
control written with a digital language, which would be the new regime of power, replacing 
the old disciplinary societies.  
“In the societies of control (…) what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, 
but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand, disciplinary societies are 
regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of 
resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to 
information, or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. 
Individuals have become ‘dividuals’, and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” 
(Deleuze 1992: 5). 
Underlining the various regimes of power (sovereignty, disciplinary and control), Deleuze 
emphasizes the organic link existing between surveillance technologies and the very exercise 
of control. It is not an isomorphism but a co-generation between technologies, code as 
language, individuals and society.  
“Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society - not that machines are 
determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and 
using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines - levers, pulleys, 
clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving 
energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of 
control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is crashing 
and whose active one is piracy or the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution 
represents, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism (…)” (Deleuze 1992: 6). 
How can one withstand virtualization and its effects? A technical answer is proposed through 
conceptual tools such as Privacy by Design, which is “an approach to protecting privacy by 
embedding it into the design specifications of technologies, business practices, and physical 
infrastructures. That means building in privacy up front - right into the design specifications 
and architecture of new systems and processes13”. This proposal incorporates the promises of 
the field of genetics and gene therapy, which would have us believe that once privacy is 
enshrined in DNA technology, it will no longer produce counter-privacy effects. In other 
words, once "vaccinated", technologies revert to a natural state of neutrality. 
This technological solution is coupled with ethical and legal responses, as illustrated for 
example by the recommendations of the The European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE) in a recent opinion (Dratwa 2014: 32). This group advocates notably for 
the application of the principle of accountability, as it argues that “Privacy Impact Assessment 
procedures must form part of regulatory practice in Member States when new or modified 
information systems which process personal data are being introduced to the market”. And as 
the UK Information Commissioner’s Office14 says: “Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) are 
an integral part of taking a privacy by design approach. (…) Privacy Impact Assessments are 
a tool that you can use to identify and reduce the privacy risks of your projects. A PIA can 
reduce the risks of harm to individuals through the misuse of their personal information. It can 
also help you to design more efficient and effective processes for handling personal data15.”  
These legal-technical responses certainly possess the virtue of paying attention to ethical and 
legal issues. The different actors engaged in the birth of these technologies try to moralize 
these technologies inside their mode of production. However, we wonder if these initiatives 
allow us to assess and respond to the material effects induced by these new forms of the 
                                                
13 https://www.ipc.on.ca/english/privacy/introduction-to-pbd/  
14 The UK’s independent authority set up to uphold information rights in the public interest promoting 
openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals. See https://ico.org.uk/  
15 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-by-design/  
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virtualization of control and surveillance? How to measure and evaluate the impact of these 
forms of political management of space, temporality and bodies? How to respond to the risk 
of de-subjectivation of the body induced by the management of "naturalized" bodies 
constructed by biometrical technologies? What are the consequences of the political 
management of virtual fences regarding the qualification or delineation of common and public 
spaces? These questions remain open. 
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